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Abstract. Ludvig Holberg was a serious feminist throughout his career. 
Unlike most Enlightenment philosophers, he insisted on extending the en-
lightened principle of equal rights to women. He was also a gifted ironist, 
and employed laughter in his quest for equality, which could be one rea-
son why his feminism has not always been taken seriously. An attempt 
is made to place Holberg’s irony in a historical perspective, as compared 
with romantic irony and Kierkegaard’s notion of that intriguing concept.
It is an honour being back in Vilnius today. It is the third time I have the 
opportunity to present some of my findings at this great department. 
I am grateful for the opportunity.
It is my intention to introduce you to, and discuss, a unique feature of 
Scandinavian Enlightenment, Holberg’s persuasion about the merits of 
equal rights for women – and the rhetorical devices he employed in his at-
tempts at persuading others about women’s rights, not least his use of irony.
I want to take my point of departure in a close reading of a Holberg 
text – a rather lengthy one, I am afraid. My excuse for the length and 
hence the time taken up by reading it is that if you carry nothing else with 
you as you leave the hall after my presentation then at least you have this 
piece of paper – which is unique. Not in Holberg’s writing (there are sev-
eral parallels) but unique in the context of the European Enlightenment.
Ludvig Holberg was a true Scandinavian, born in Bergen, Norway 
1684; he travelled and learned in Europe  – England, France, Italy, 
Holland – and settled in Copenhagen where he remained and produced 
a voluminous work until his life ended in 1754. The text that I now quote 
is from his mature years, age 55:1
 1 Excerpt from Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754), “Helte Historier” (1739) (‘Hero 
Tales’) in: Samlede Skrifter, vol. 11, 1931, p. 306. Translated by Melissa Wieser.
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Yet, since time immemorial, everyone has chosen to disregard this 
basic rule with respect to women, and thus deem one half of the 
earth’s inhabitants unfit for difficult and important tasks. I concede 
that the overwhelming unanimity of all people and all ages seems 
to be a sort of evidence which is not easily discarded, were it not 
for the fact that nature, which does nothing in vain, has distributed 
its gifts evenly among the two sexes. To deny this would be to deny 
everyday experience.
The following objections can be raised to this position:
(1) nature has distinguished women from men by endowing them 
with a delicate body and frail limbs;
(2) childbirth, which renders women unsuited to men’s work, at 
least for a few weeks a year;
(3) certain proclivities such as instability, rashness, undue fear, im-
patience, and other frailties which some have observed more often in 
one sex than in the other.
(1) As far as the first objection is concerned, it certainly cannot be
denied that one sex is of slighter build than the other – as is also the 
case in a number of animal species – and hence less suited to heavy la-
bour. However, if this argument is furthered too impetuously, a woman 
might object that since nature has distinguished men from women by 
powerful and strong limbs, then, by that very distinction, nature has 
indicated that men are destined for the menial tasks which depend 
solely on the body’s strength, while women are destined for the more 
subtle professions whose execution depends solely on the mind.
Furthermore – a woman might object – since heads will always be 
needed to invent and hands to execute, nature has provided that the 
women should make the plans for construction while men should 
break lime, cut timber, and carry brick; nature has provided that the 
former, who have the wits, shall sit in counsel and courts while the 
latter, who swagger about with their strong arms, should execute the 
women’s verdicts and decisions; that nature has ordained the former 
to determine how a plot of land can be best prepared, sowed, and 
planted, while entrusting the latter and stronger with the job of har-
vesting and threshing the grain.
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It does not seem profitable to further too vigorously an argument 
against which such objections may be raised. It makes more sense 
to say that if nature has distributed the mental gifts indiscriminately 
among both sexes, and if suitable heads for important matters are in 
short supply – as indeed they are in many countries – why then ex-
clude one half of the human race solely on the basis of gender?
(2) The argument derived from the fact of childbirth and its cor-
responding inconveniences seems to carry greater weight. But the 
question remains: if a woman had a different upbringing, might she 
not have a different lying-in? There have been, and still are, women 
who the day after childbirth begin their usual work again. According 
to travellers’ accounts, it is customary in a certain country for a wife 
to get up immediately upon childbirth, while her husband lies in her 
place on the bed to accept congratulations.
But even granting that nature requires a woman to lie in after 
childbirth as long as is customary, we can conclude nothing more 
than that she becomes unsuitable for business for six weeks annu-
ally, whereas many a witless man remains unsuitable throughout the 
entire year. This being the case, the state of affairs in the afore-men-
tioned country is not so bad. Nor is a husband speaking amiss if he 
says to his wife, “Please rush back to your desk and let me lie in in-
stead of you, then both tasks will be taken care of.”
(3) As for women’s proclivities, it may be true that the fragilities 
enumerated above are found to a greater degree in the female gender. 
It remains an open question, however, if they are a product of nature 
or nurture. If a young girl were brought up for men’s businesses, if she 
were entrusted with important matters for which she alone would be 
held accountable, if she were held liable for each unprofitable word 
she uttered, if she were praised for bravery and blamed for timidity – 
would she not be accredited virtues, instead of mistakes and frailties?
In the same manner, if men received the same upbringing as 
women, many of their accredited virtues might be transformed to 
faults and weaknesses: idle talk might then be called “men’s gossip”, 
losing one’s temper “masculine frailty”. In the same vein, just as now 
when a mistake is made, the saying is, “Forgive her, she is a fragile 
woman”, the saying will then be, “Forgive him, he’s a fragile man.”
This, I say, remains to be tested. Only then can we decide whether 
or not we are confounding nature with custom and upbringing. 
[…] My critique is not aimed at appropriating any new rights to 
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women, bur simply at demonstrating that the exclusion of women on 
the basis of their gender and the arguments generally used for such 
purpose are not valid.
After a series of examples suggesting, with reference to common sense, 
that people should do what they are best at, omitted here, the author 
poses the fundamental question: why is that sound principle disregarded 
with respect to women?
He suggests 3 reasons. I wish to inspect them one at a time (it is I who 
have put in the numbers to make it easier for us to survey the structure 
of his arguments).
(1) Men are strong, women weak. The argument has the obvious 
corollary: women should be architects, purveyors of intellectual work, 
while men should do the heavy work. In other words, if you press this 
argument, it will support unequal rights, in favour of women!
(2) Childbirth – a good argument on the face of it. Women do bear 
children. But the sociology of giving birth, the entire charade surround-
ing childbirth, is culture, not nature. – ‘a certain country’-argument (cus-
tomary for the Enlightenment: Diderot and Tahiti) – a stupid man is 
of no use throughout the year, a clever woman is of no use only for “six 
weeks annually”!
(3) Women’s nature: Holberg discusses the proper dividing line be-
tween nature and nurture. First paragraph: nature has distributed its 
gifts evenly; now gifts are not evenly distributed: women are slanderous, 
unstable, given to gossip. But we do not know whether these proclivi-
ties are given or constructed. Let us examine.
Last paragraph: Holberg is not idolizing women. He is simply imply-
ing that while a stupid woman can be as stupid as a stupid man, an intel-
ligent woman can be as intelligent as an intelligent man. Holberg is not 
arguing for ‘affirmative action’ in favour of the underprivileged gender, 
but simply for an even playing field.
If there were no parallels in Holberg’s other writings, the text could 
be a whim. But there are many parallels. The equal rights issue pops up 
throughout his career as a writer. Yet it has barely been noticed until the 
end of the 20th century. Why?
In order to understand this mysterious black hole in the reception of 
Holberg we have to take a detour to the phenomenon of irony. I have 
deliberately chosen a text by Holberg which is almost devoid of irony – 
not quite, there is a certain amount of irony in argument (2) about the 
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man lying-in instead of the woman. Elsewhere Holberg was a master 
ironist. I will revert to that later. I leave Holberg for a while and turn to 
the history and forms of irony.
The notion of irony was invented by the ancient Greeks. The eiron 
was a character in Greek comedy, a poor and intelligent fellow who by 
means of pretension outsmarts the alazon, who possesses more wealth 
than wit. In Quintilian, the rhetorician, irony receives its classical defi-
nition: irony is “a figure of speech by which one indicates the opposite 
of what one says” – with the important addition that for irony to be 
properly executed the utterance must be understood to mean the op-
posite of what one says – by means of either 1. speaker, 2. text, 3. tone, 
or 4. context.
During the 16th and 17th centuries the term irony (at least in the 
English speaking world) degenerated into a loose term for fun speech: 
banter, raillery, mockery, derision, ridicule of every sort.
It is not until the rise of satire during the Enlightenment in the early 
18th century that a new and precise meaning of irony came into existence, 
one outstanding and memorable version of which is Jonathan Swift’s 
A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People From Being 
a Burden to Their Parents or Country, and for Making Them Beneficial to 
the Publick (1729).
Swift’s point of departure and premise of reasoning is the ‘melan-
choly’ sight that meets the stranger in the streets of Dublin “crowded 
with beggars of the female sex, followed by 3, 4 or 6 children, all in rags 
and importuning every passenger for an alms”.
These poor kids have only two prospects: they can become thieves 
or sell themselves as slaves in the West Indies. For a long while Swift 
withholds the actual content of his proposal; instead, he lists its many 
advantages: it will provide not only for the offspring of beggars but for 
all Irish children; it will do away with ‘voluntary abortions’, it will di-
minish infanticide; and so on.
Only then does he present his proposal, which is to butcher the better 
part of the one-year-old children and sell the meat which is supposed to 
be a “most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, 
roasted, baked, or boiled”.
He then goes into details such as “A child will make two dishes at an 
entertainment for friends; and when the family dines alone, the fore or 
hind quarter will make a reasonable dish, and seasoned with a little pep-
per or salt will be very good boiled on the fourth day, especially in winter”.
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Swift’s Modest Proposal is the archetype of enlightenment irony, 
i.e. irony used as a corrective measure to draw the reader’s attention to 
a social evil which ought to be removed or improved.
If you are opposed to something, you may say so in so many words. 
You may also say something else and then, as does Swift, take that ‘some-
thing else’ to absurd lengths in the hope that your reader a) gets indig-
nant, and b) gets entertained.
There is, however, the risk that amusement may overrule correction. 
That is probably what happened to Holberg and his quest for equal rights.
Here is another instance of Holberg’s pleading for women’s equal 
rights.
In 1722 he published ‘Zille Hans Dotters Gynaicologia eller Forsvars 
Skrift for Qvinde-Kiønnet’ literally translated: ‘A Vindication of the 
Rights of Women’ (a title which it took English literature another 80 
years to come up with). Holberg uses a woman, Zille, as his mouthpiece. 
In his presentation of her he makes ample use of irony.
The little Zille pleads with her father for permission to learn Latin 
and read books. Her father turns her away with the obvious remark 
that such interests are for her brother to take care of while she ought to 
look to her mother for the skills in house and kitchen that are appro-
priate for a woman.
Zille does not give up. She goes on to suggest to her father that the 
choice between a male or a female name not be made while the individ-
ual in question is still a baby, whose faculties and propensities are not 
yet known, but rather be postponed until that person has become old 
enough to show his or her talents, in order that the person in question 
not be excluded from an academic career by virtue of nothing other than 
being the bearer of a female name! And further, Zille maintains, what is 
there to suggest that a woman should not be able to sleep as soundly on 
the judge’s bench as any man, or make herself as unintelligible in Latin 
as well as any man.
This Zille Hansdotter is not of the opinion that everybody is equal in the 
sense that everybody is capable of doing everything. Far from it. Rather 
she is of the opinion (shared by Holberg as we have seen) that “there 
are in this world good and evil, wise and stupid, men as well as women.”
At the end of Zille Hansdotter’s ‘Vindication of the Rights of Women’ 
she sums up the whole argument in the following lines:2
 2 Ludvig Holberg, Samlede Skrifter, vol. 2, 1914, p. 530. My translation.
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Jeg Sværdet ey af Skeeden tar, I shall not unsheathe my sword,
Naar man kun tilstaaer dette: if only you grant me this much:
Hvis meere os betroet var, Were we to be entrusted with more 
 responsibilities
Vi kunde meer forrette. we would behave more responsibly.
What Holberg is saying here is (just like in the text you have been read-
ing): you do not have to admire each and every aspect of the so-called 
feminine psyche; I just want you to consider the possibility that some 
of the less desirable characteristics of that psyche, which are the ground 
on which women are excluded, may be caused by that very exclusion.
Summing up: Holberg – sometimes straightforward, more often in 
ironic form – suggested that ‘nature has distributed its gifts evenly among 
the sexes’ and that hence it is both unfair and wasteful to exclude half of 
humankind from the responsible and creative professions.
I shall take a short break from the history of irony and put Holberg’s 
position on the gender issue in context.
There are various definitions of the Enlightenment but none that does 
not emphasise equal rights. The philosophers of the Enlightenment 
were anxious to curb the privileges of clergy and nobility. The urge for 
equality is inscribed in the most canonical of all Enlightenment texts, 
the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. “All men are created 
equal with inalienable rights etc.”
But as Jefferson was penning these words, “All men (meaning: ‘alle 
mennesker, alle Menschen’) it was getting dark; in came his wife (and 
a black servant) with a candle each so that he could continue writing: 
“… are created equal”. Not for one moment did it occur to him that the 
woman and the Negro might be endowed with those same inalienable 
rights.
The same goes for the other enlighteners, Kant, Rousseau, Diderot – 
none of them considered equal rights for women, some ridiculed the 
very notion. I know of only one major Enlightenment thinker who did 
just that: Ludvig Holberg. A number of Holberg’s main concerns – re-
ligious toleration, natural law, empiricism – he shared with European 
predecessors. In his thinking about gender he was ahead of the entire 
Enlightenment Hall of Fame. The question arises: why was he not cred-
ited for his unique advanced thinking concerning women’s rights?
The answer, I think, is: his irony.
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For more than two centuries scholars and commentators did not find 
that worthy of comment or, if they did, just mentioned it in passing. The 
most prestigious Danish literary scholar, probably of all times, Vilhelm 
Andersen, is as good an example as any. He did not suppress the evidence 
for Holberg’s feminism (1934); he simply mentions it and then does not 
use it as evidence of anything. He refers to Zille Hansdotter, reports her 
views, labels her a ‘blue-stocking’, and then praises Holberg’s wit in the 
execution plus his dependence on Latin literature.
I have come upon only one earlier scholar, C. W. Smith, who (in 1868) 
took Holberg’s feminism seriously and then went on to enquire how 
Holberg might have gotten the crazy idea that gifted girls ought to have 
the same access to higher education as gifted boys. The only reason 
Mr Smith can think of is that Holberg was a poor bachelor throughout 
his life and hence “never had the opportunity to experience in what 
context a woman’s spiritual gifts come into their own most beautifully”, 
i.e. as a man’s wife.
Is irony a special Danish phenomenon? I have been asked by one of our 
hosts to consider. The history of the reception of Holberg’s ironical cru-
sade for women’s right does not suggest that Danes are particularly tal-
ented when it comes to decoding irony. What does speak in favour of a 
national propensity for irony is the fact that the two masters of Danish 
literature of the 19th century, Andersen and Kierkegaard, like Holberg 
of the 18th century, were also masters of irony.
Between Holberg and the two of them a most difficult and peculiar 
notion had arisen, that of Romantic irony. Enlightened irony is correc-
tive, Romantic irony is – well a number of things, one of them was that 
the Romantic ironists were fond of breaking the illusion by means of 
self-reference, that is, by referring to the work within the work.
Hans Christian Andersen was infatuated with Romantic irony when 
he started his career. His Journey on Foot is full to the point of nausea 
with reference to contemporary Germans and to his own book. Later, 
in his fairy-tales, he learned how to curb that addiction. He also devel-
oped a shrewd and highly personal use of enlightened irony. Listen to 
this dialogue between the ugly duckling and the cat in The Ugly Duckling:
– Can you arch your back? Can you purr? Can you make sparks?
– No.
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– Well, in that case, you have no right to have an opinion when sensi-
ble people are talking.
That is an instance of irony by means of point-of-view technique. 
Andersen employs the animals as representatives of a narrow-minded-
ness which the narrator does not share and the reader understands that 
he is not to share, but rather subject to a corrective laughter.
Andersen spans the width from Romantic irony to Enlightened irony 
with more ease than any other Danish writer.
For Kierkegaard irony is not just a figure of speech but a manner of 
life. He opposes the Romantic writers, only to launch a concept of irony 
that spans the entire existence:
Anyone who does not understand irony at all, who has no ear for its 
whispering, lacks the absolute beginning of a personal life. … He 
does not know the refreshment and strengthening that come with 
undressing when the air gets too hot and heavy, and diving into the 
sea of irony – not in order to stay there, of course, but in order to 
come out healthy, happy, and buoyant and to dress again.3
To Kierkegaard, irony was just the beginning. But what an enthusi-
astic beginning!
Still, it does not follow from Holberg’s, Andersen’s, and Kierkegaard’s 
preference for irony that irony is a specifically Danish phenomenon or 
attitude. I have recently published a book on irony4 and hence talked to 
and with many people about the concept of irony. It is my impression 
that those who favour the notion that Danes are particularly prone to 
irony tend to be Danes. In one of the many books I have studied for my 
own research I read that the typical ironist is a yankee; that book was 
written by an American.
I can sum up the question of irony and national identity by reporting 
an episode at my department in Copenhagen thirty years ago. A play 
about Hans Christian Andersen, Från regnormarnas liv (‘Rain Snakes’), 
had just opened at The Royal Theatre. At our department we had a 
panel discussion with actors, the director and the author of the play, the 
Swedish writer P. O. Enquist.
 3 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, Princeton University Press, 1968, 326f.
 4 Thomas Bredsdorff, Ironiens pris, Fire store ironikere og et begreb, Gyldendal, 2011.
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During the question and answer-time a lady from the audience asked 
Mr Enquist: “Wasn’t it difficult for you as a Swede to deal with such a 
typically Danish ironist as Andersen?”
Enquist replied: “I see Andersen as intelligent, witty, very fast think-
ing and ironical – in other words, typically Swedish.”
Thank you for your attention – and congratulations on your twentieth 
birthday.
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